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Abstract 
Every decade the United States conducts a census of the population, which is used to allocate 
congressional seats amongst the states. To reflect this change, states also redraw their voting 
districts. They do this in three major ways: through their state legislatures, through an 
independent commission, or through a hybrid system. This paper contends that these different 
means of redrawing states' districts have differing effects on the outcomes of congressional 
elections, as well as on the level of polarization in Congress. Specifically, this paper examines 
election data for the House of Representatives from each state during the years 2002 to 2010, as 
well as calculated scores of polarization for each elected candidate. Using this data, this paper 
analyzes the relative impact of each redistricting method and how it accounts for the current 
level of polarization in the House of Representatives. Lastly, this paper will use these findings to 
make policy recommendations for the future. 
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Introduction 
Last November, a New York Times/CBS News poll reported that only 12 percent of 
Americans approve of the job Congress is doing. Many politicians, media figures, and normal 
citizens have lost faith in the government, become fed up with political bickering, and claimed 
that Congress is “broken” (Svenson and Thompson, 2011). This polarization has been 
exacerbated by a shift away from moderation and a lack of compromise. According to a recent 
Gallup poll, items related to gridlock, such as bickering, a lack of compromise, and a lack of 
making decisions, accounted for 59 percent of why Americans disapprove of the job Congress is 
doing (Saad, 2013). If the view of this gridlock and inefficiency is so overwhelmingly negative, 
why is Congress so polarized? 
One theory is that there is a relationship between congressional polarization, the level of 
competition within voting districts, and the methods by which states redraw these district lines. 
Thomas Mann and Bruce Cain posit that redistricting is “one of the forces responsible for the ills 
associated with contemporary congressional elections, from the decline of competitive seats to 
the growing ideological polarization of the parties” (2005). Works by Jamie Carson and Michael 
Crespin show that “more competitive elections occur when courts and commissions are directly 
involved in the redistricting process, as opposed to when redistricting is handled only in the state 
legislative process” (2004). They also have done research showing that elevated levels of party 
polarization can be partly attributed to redistricting (Carson et al., 2007). Additionally, Dennis 
Thompson concludes that partisan redistricting is an anti-democratic measure that undermines 
popular control because it gives “the representatives who are to be controlled significant 
influence over the means by which they are controlled” (2004). 
However, another view is that having non-competitive districts allows voters to be more 
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pleased with the outcome of their elections, making Congress a better view of the people's voice. 
Thus, polarization is a reflection of the people’s interests. Justin Buchler claims that competitive 
districts actually work against the goals of democracy because they decrease representation, 
whereas non-competitive districts “lead to smaller ideological differences between the positions 
of district median voters and their representatives…and a distribution of ideology in the 
legislature that is closer to the distribution of ideology in the electorate” (2005). Thomas Brunell 
echoes this claim, arguing that states should “pack districts with as many like-minded partisans 
as possible” because voters whose preferred candidate wins are systematically happier than those 
who did not vote for the winning candidate (2006). He also says that the safe district method 
“always produces representation that reflects the partisan leanings of the state” and allows the 
representative “to be responsive to the entire district since the constituents all belong to the same 
party” (Brunell, 2008). 
The difference between these two views boils down to efficacy versus voter happiness. 
The first argument lauds competition and limited polarization because it makes Congress more 
efficient by lessening gridlock. The other argument claims that non-competitive districts allow 
voters to be happy with the results of elections, thus creating a better form of representation. 
However, as the two aforementioned polls show, voters are neither happy with the job that their 
representatives are doing, nor the polarization within Congress. This paper takes the view that 
government’s main purpose is to properly serve the people whom it represents. While safe 
districts and polarized parties might work well in a multi-party environment where coalitions are 
possible, in a two party system these things affect gridlock, limiting the ability of government to 
serve its role. To this end, this paper aims to prove that competition within districts is related to 
the method by which states redraw their districts, specifically concerning the level of partisan 
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involvement. Additionally, this paper will show that district competition is a contributing factor 
to government polarization. 
These claims will be shown through an analysis of election outcomes, levels of 
polarization, and methods of redistricting in the United States from the years 2002-2010, 
particularly focusing on elections for the House of Representatives. The next section provides 
background information on how states redistrict, followed by the methodology of this study, the 
results and their analysis, and conclusions that can be drawn from it, as well as recommendations 
for future action. 
 
Background 
 Regulations  
 In order to fully understand the possible effects of congressional redistricting, it is 
important to first know about how the process works. Apportionment is the process by which 
seats in the House of Representatives are allocated to states, and reapportionment is adjustment 
of this allocation every ten years based on population and coinciding with the federal census. At 
a minimum, then, states must redistrict every decade (Levitt and Wood, 2010) 
 The regulations for redrawing districts are split into two parts: those controlled by the 
federal government and those controlled by the states. There are two major federal regulations 
that congressional redistricting plans must follow. The first involves district populations. 
According to federal law, each state's districts must have equal population “as nearly as is 
practicable” (Wesberry v. Sanders, 1964). This means that states must attempt to draw districts so 
that each one is as close as possible to the “ideal” district and any major deviation from this must 
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be specifically justified (Levitt and Wood, 2010). For example, if your state had five districts and 
one hundred residents, your “ideal” district would have twenty people. In the 2000 redistricting 
cycle, no states had average population deviations over one percent (National Conference of 
State Legislatures, 2004). 
 The other federal regulation involves race and ethnicity. In the past, different tactics have 
been used to limit the voting power of minorities. Two of these tactics are “cracking” and 
“packing”. Cracking is unfairly splitting up a voting minority over many districts to dilute their 
voting power. Packing, on the other hand, is when as much of a minority is drawn into one 
district as possible in order to keep all of their voting power in one area. Other tactics that have 
been used include voting prerequisites, such as passing a particular test before voting (Levitt and 
Wood, 2010).  
 However, these prejudicial practices are not allowed in the redistricting process. 
According to the Voting Rights Act, “No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision 
to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or 
color” (1965). The Supreme Court has also declared in multiple rulings that neither race nor 
ethnicity can be the predominant reason for a district's shape (Bush v. Vera, 1996; Shaw v. Reno, 
1993; Miller v. Johnson, 1995).  
 In order to prevent these abuses, some states, or part of states, that have historically had 
issues with voting equality were subject to a process called preclearance, meaning that the 
Department of Justice must approve their redistricting plans (Voting Rights Act, 1965). In the 
2000 cycle, 16 states were affected by preclearance: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, most of Virginia, four counties in California, five 
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counties in Florida, two townships in Michigan, 10 towns in New Hampshire, three counties in 
New York, 40 counties in North Carolina, and two counties in South Dakota (The Leadership 
Conference on Civil and Human Rights, 2013). Redistricting plans were usually approved if they 
did not dilute minority votes or cause retrogression in the political opportunities of minorities. 
Retrogression occurred if the new plan gave minorities a lessened opportunity to elect their 
candidates of choice, relative to the prior plan (Levitt, 2013). However, as of June 2013, the 
Supreme Court struck down the section of the Voting Rights Act that requires preclearance on a 
5-4 ruling in the case of Shelby County v. Holder. Regarding racial discrimination in 
redistricting, the opinion stated that “things have changed dramatically” in the South and other 
regions since the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed (Reilly et al., 2013). 
 Beyond these federal rules, states also institute further regulations. These additional 
guidelines vary from state to state, but they are used to achieve the same basic goals. The most 
common goal is district contiguity. This means that all parts of a district are physically connected 
and adjacent, as opposed to having sections of the district split apart by other districts. Another 
common goal of state regulations is to limit the splitting of political boundaries, such as counties, 
cities, and townships. However, states vary in how much flexibility they allow, and these 
boundaries sometimes need to be split in order to accommodate the federal requirements, which 
supersede state laws. Additionally, states often try to maintain “compact” districts. While this is a 
vague term, again with much variation, it generally means that the populations within a district 
are relatively close together. This compactness can be shown by how far people live from the 
center of their district, or whether or not populations near a district are bypassed for ones that are 
further away. Another common goal is to maintain “communities of interest”. A community of 
interest is basically any group of the population in an area with similar interests, whether social, 
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cultural, or economic. The other goals listed above often fulfill this on their own (Levitt and 
Wood, 2010). These goals are generally considered positive; however, there can be a goal of 
redistricting that is negative. Gerrymandering is the conscious manipulation of district lines in 
order to achieve some sort of political power. There are two major varieties; one is partisan 
gerrymandering, which is when a particular party draws district lines in a way that favors itself. 
The other type is incumbent protection, by which the parties in a state agree to divide districts in 
a way that maintains the balance of power (Levitt and Wood, 2010). 
 Models 
 For the purpose of this paper, the different ways in which states redraw their federal 
congressional districts have been broken down into three major categories. The first category is 
by a legislature-controlled process. 33 states use this type of process. Some of them introduce 
plans as a normal legislation, while others form joint or special committees. Either way, they all 
place the responsibility of redistricting in the hands of the state legislature (FairVote, 2004). 
Additionally, some states require that, if the legislature fails to enact a plan within a certain 
period of time, state or federal courts must step in to redraw the districts. In the 2000 cycle, 
seven of these states (Colorado, Minnesota, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, 
and Texas) had to have their districts redrawn by the courts (Levitt, 2013). All of the states give 
veto power to the governor, except for North Carolina (FairVote, 2004). It is important to note 
that California implemented an independent commission system for the 2010 cycle and beyond 
(Howle, 2009), and also that states often do not draw their state legislature districts with the same 
methods as their federal districts. 
 Two of the states with legislature systems redistricted multiple times in this cycle. One of 
the states was Georgia, in which the legislature redrew districts again in 2005. One reason this 
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happened was because the legislature decided that there was too much splitting of county 
borders. The other reason was because Georgia's Republican-controlled legislature hoped to give 
Republicans two more seats in the 2006 midterm elections. However, the Democratic candidates, 
John Barrow and Jim Marshall, both held onto their seats (Hood and McKee, 2009). This was a 
modest attempt compared to Texas, the other state that re-redistricted. After the 2000 census, 
Texas's congressional districts had been drawn by a federal court. However, once Republicans 
took back control of the state government in 2003, they decided to attempt a second redistricting 
process. Twice during this process, the state's Democratic representatives actually fled the state 
in order to deny a quorum, which is the minimum number of representatives needed to be present 
in order to cast an official vote. After lots of bickering and a media frenzy, a plan was eventually 
adopted that swayed the state's federal delegation even further in favor of the Republicans 
(Congressional Districts in the 2000s, 2003). As these examples show, sometimes legislatures 
can have very partisan agendas when it comes to redistricting. 
 Four states use hybrid plans that also use some sort of independent commission in order 
to put a check on the redistricting power of the legislature. Maine has an Advisory 
Apportionment Commission that is made up of 15 members. 12 of them are people appointed by 
the majority and minority leaders in the state House and Senate, and the other three are general 
members of the public. The Commission creates a plan for redistricting and submits it to the 
legislature, which has the authority to alter it (FairVote, 2004). If the legislature still cannot 
approve a plan, the duty of redistricting falls to the state Supreme Court, as was the case in the 
2000 cycle (Levitt, 2013).  
 In Connecticut, Illinois, and Mississippi, the legislatures have primary responsibility for 
redistricting plans. However, if they fail to enact a plan by a particular deadline, a backup 
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commission is put in place to redraw the districts (FairVote, 2004). In the 2000 cycle, 
Connecticut and Illinois both resorted to these backup commissions (Connecticut State Data 
Center, 2003; Levitt, 2013). Mississippi did as well; however, it too failed to put forth a plan, and 
the districts were drawn by a state court (Levitt, 2013). 
 For congressional districts, six states basically remove the control of the legislature 
altogether by implementing redistricting systems that use independent commissions. They are 
Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, New Jersey, and Washington. Arizona redistricts using its 
Independent Redistricting Commission. This five-member commission acts independently of the 
State Legislature. The state Commission on Appellate Court Appointments nominates 10 
Republicans, 10 Democrats, and five independents. From the 25 nominees, two from each party 
are selected for the commission by party leaders in the state House and Senate, and those four 
then choose one of the nominated independents to serve as chairman. The commission does not 
base its districting off of previous years, but rather starts with a grid map only considering equal 
population and contiguity.  It then modifies the map to account for four other criteria: compliance 
with federal regulations, maintaining communities of interest; maintaining geographic features 
and borders, and the creation of competitive districts, so long as it does not interfere with the 
previous goals (Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 2011). 
 Hawaii, New Jersey, and Washington all have very similar systems. Party leaders appoint 
equal numbers of people to the commissions, none of whom may be government officials. 
Hawaii has eight members, New Jersey 10, and Washington four. The commissioners work 
together to appoint another member, who acts as chairman. However, if they cannot decide 
within a certain time frame, the state Supreme Courts select the final member (Hawaii Office of 
Elections, 2001; New Jersey Apportionment Commission 2013; FairVote, 2004). 
12 
 
 Idaho's commission is slightly different from those of Hawaii, New Jersey, and 
Washington. It is comprised of six members who are not government officials, appointed by 
party leadership in the state House and Senate, as well as the chairs of the state parties. However, 
instead of appointing their own chair to make the commission an odd number, thus avoiding ties 
in decision-making, Idaho's commission instead works with an even number. If the 
reapportionment commission cannot reach a decision, the matter is decided by the state Supreme 
Court (Idaho Legislative Services Office, 2002). In the 2000 cycle, the commission was able to 
reach a decision on its own (Levitt, 2013). 
 Iowa's redistricting system uses a non-partisan government body, the Iowa Legislative 
Service Agency, for drawing its districts (Cook, 2007). The ILSA cannot consider data like 
previous election results, incumbents' residences, or the political affiliation of registered voters 
when drawing districts. Its driving goal is to make the districts as equal in population as possible, 
while including other considerations such as compactness, maintaining county borders, and 
keeping districts contiguous. According to Ed Cook, senior legal analyst with the Legislative 
Services Agency, "The thing that makes us unique to most states is basically we don't take into 
account any political information” (Nelson, 2010). While the ILSA's plan is technically subject 
to the approval of the Iowa state legislature, there has not been any history of contention since 
implementing their system (Levitt, 2013). 
 
Methodology 
 This paper is concerned with the effects that different methods of redistricting may have 
on the competitiveness of congressional elections, as well as the level of polarization within 
Congress. Because of this, a period of five federal elections for the House of Representatives is 
13 
 
examined. These five elections occurred in 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010, and correspond to 
the 108th, 109th, 110th, 111th, and 112th Congresses. All of these elections happened after the 2000 
census and before the publishing of the 2010 census results. Thus, this series of elections, for the 
most part, are consistent in terms of how each state's districts are drawn, as well as the 
apportionment of representatives to each state. It is also important to note that this paper only 
observes 43 of 50 states. This is because seven states (Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming) only have one district, making them irrelevant to 
a study of redistricting. 
 One of the major areas of data used is the election outcomes during these years. Within 
each state, the percentages of votes garnered by the winning candidates were closely examined. 
Candidates who ran unopposed were credited with receiving 100 percent of votes. The election 
outcome data was gathered from Wikipedia.org. The other major form of data is the 
measurements of congressional polarization by means of scoring roll-call voting, or the totality 
of votes in a session of Congress. These measurements come from a system created by Jeffrey B. 
Lewis, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. Their system calculates the relative polarization 
levels within different sessions of Congress, which are referred to as DW-NOMINATE scores 
(Lewis, Poole, and Rosenthal 2013). 
 DW-NOMINATE was developed as an alternative to ideology ratings published by 
interest groups. These interest groups typically select a small number of votes that they deem 
important, and use those votes to assign rankings (Trende, 2012). However, this approach leads 
to large amounts of bias and a rather extreme perception of ideology. Conversely, DW-
NOMINATE is designed to show a more neutral view of a legislator's ideological profile by 
factoring in all votes. Thus, it attempts “to reverse-engineer the ‘ideology’ from the votes, 
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without looking at the content of the votes themselves” (Trende, 2012). 
 In order to do this, DW-NOMINATE operates under the assumption that legislators with 
similar ideologies will vote together more frequently than those with differing ideologies. 
Basically, a conservative Republican will vote in line with other Republicans more frequently 
than with a liberal Democrat (Trende, 2012). It is important to note that these scores are not 
measures of ideology in and of themselves; rather, they are measures of polarization, or how far 
apart politicians' voting is. DW-NOMINATE plots all votes from a particular session of Congress 
on a linear scale, and then gives each member a score, mostly ranging from -1 to 1, based on 
their distance from the center. 
 This process is much like measuring distance between cities. For example, if Cincinnati, 
Columbus, and Cleveland were all plotted on a line based on distance, Cincinnati and Cleveland 
would be on opposite sides, with Columbus in between but slightly closer to Cincinnati. While 
this linear perspective only offers insight into where the cities are located relative to each other, a 
practical knowledge of the state of Ohio helps determine that Cincinnati is in the southwest, 
Columbus in the center, and Cleveland in the northeast. In a similar fashion, a practical 
knowledge of the current political landscape helps to develop an understanding of how these 
scores of polarization relate to ideological standing. For example, in the 112th Congress, the 
conservative John Boehner (R-OH) and the liberal Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) voted very 
differently from each other. This results in Boehner having a score close to 1, whereas Kucinich's 
score is closer to -1, and most other representatives fall in between. Thus, if zero is the middle of 
the polarization scale, scores above zero tend to be Republican and scores below zero tend to be 
Democrat. 
 This paper also labels states by the way they draw their new districts. Most states rely on 
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their state legislatures to pass redistricting plans. These systems might vary slightly, such as 
whether or not the governor has the power to veto the plan, or whether or not the state courts 
may intervene if the legislature fails to pass a plan in a certain period of time. However, as a 
general rule, these states can be categorized as one group. Another way states redistrict is by 
forming an independent commission that operates outside the government. Again, there may be 
some variation, especially in how the commissions are formed, but due to their independent and 
non- or bi-partisan nature, they are effectively grouped together. The third category consists of 
states that use a hybrid system. This means that an independent commission either assists the 
legislature in forming a redistricting plan, or, if the legislature fails to meet their deadline for 
passing a plan, the task of redistricting is turned over to an independent commission. In the tables 
that will be seen in the next section, the categories are listed as legislature, commission, and 
hybrid, and the specifics of each state's method has been discussed above in further detail. 
 The last major element of this paper’s methodology is multiple regression analyses. One 
analysis examines the relationship between redistricting and the competitiveness of elections, in 
which the three models of redistricting are the independent variables, and the percentage of the 
total votes gained is the dependent variable. In order to factor in the models of redistricting, each 
type was treated as a “dummy” variable. This means that a positive result receives a “1” and a 
negative result receives a “0”. For example, for the commission system variable, if a state has a 
commission system it receives a “1”. If it does not, it receives a “0”. The same is true for the 
hybrid and legislature system variables. When doing the regression, only two of the three 
variables need to be accounted for because their outcomes are relative to the outcome of the 
third. Thus, this paper tests the commission and hybrid system dummy variables, and examines 
their outcomes in relation to legislature systems. 
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The other two analyses focus on the relationship between the competitiveness of elections 
and the polarization of representatives from each political party. In these, the percentage of the 
total votes gained is the independent variable, and the Democratic and Republican polarization 
scores serve as the dependent variables. For all regressions used, the maximum permitted 
significance has been set at 0.05. This means that in order for a relationship to be considered 
accurate, the chance that it occurred randomly must be below five percent. This is a standard 
benchmark in linear regression. These different regressions were conducted using the IBM SPSS 
Statistics software. 
 This study focuses on methods of redistricting, competitiveness of districts as measured 
by the percentage of votes garnered by winning candidates, and the polarization of 
representatives. This approach does have a major limitation because it considers voters to be a 
constant. This means that regional and district differences in things like party alignment, 
demography, and levels of urbanization are not factored into the analysis. Additionally, the 
benefits of incumbency, such as more exposure to voters, are not considered. 
 
Results 
 The table on the following page presents each state's data for their congressional elections 
for the years 2002 through 2010. It shows the average percentage of votes garnered by the 
winners of states' elections and the standard deviations from those averages. Additionally, it 
shows the number of Democratic and Republican representatives for each state during the five 
Congresses. 
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State Avg Pct of Vote Standard Deviation
AL 76.1% 17.6%
AZ 60.8% 8.1%
AR 72.9% 16.2%
CA 69.0% 11.1%
CO 61.0% 7.9%
CT 61.7% 8.9%
FL 71.4% 16.4%
GA 74.1% 16.1%
HI 66.4% 8.3%
ID 62.0% 9.1%
IL 69.4% 12.3%
IN 60.1% 7.1%
IA 57.1% 4.8%
KS 64.7% 12.4%
KY 65.0% 12.0%
LA 71.6% 16.6%
ME 59.9% 5.9%
MD 70.1% 10.1%
MA 81.6% 17.8%
MI 66.6% 10.9%
MN 60.8% 7.4%
MS 66.6% 9.0%
MO 65.6% 7.5%
NE 67.6% 13.2%
NV 58.3% 8.5%
NH 55.1% 4.4%
NJ 67.7% 11.6%
NM 60.8% 12.5%
NY 72.6% 15.1%
NC 64.7% 9.1%
OH 64.4% 10.6%
OK 68.6% 9.9%
OR 64.4% 8.5%
PA 67.3% 15.3%
RI 66.6% 7.9%
SC 67.0% 11.4%
TN 70.8% 11.2%
TX 70.0% 12.9%
UT 62.0% 6.7%
VA 68.5% 15.3%
WA 63.1% 8.1%
WV 67.4% 14.5%
WI 68.1% 11.7%
State Statistics for Congressional Election 
Ouctomes (2002-2010)
 
18 
 
 The graph below relates to the previous table. It shows the number of representatives that 
achieved certain percentages of the vote. The minimum vote achieved by a winner was 44.8 
percent (Jean Schmidt, R-OH). The maximum was 100 percent, meaning those running were 
unopposed. The average was 68.0 percent. 
  
The next table represents state statistics for representatives' polarization scores. For each 
state, it shows the average polarization score for each party over the five Congresses, as well as 
the standard deviation of all scores. Massachusetts had the most polarized Democrats, with an 
average score of -0.51, and Oklahoma had the least polarized Democrats, averaging a score of -
0.09. Nebraska had no Democratic representatives in this period. Wisconsin had the most 
polarized Republicans, with an average score of 0.85, and Connecticut had the least polarized 
19 
 
Republicans, averaging a score of 0.31. Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island had no 
Republican representatives during this stretch. 
State
Avg Dem 
Score
Avg Rep 
Score
Standard 
Deviation
AL -0.15 0.52 0.32
AZ -0.36 0.80 0.61
AR -0.22 0.52 0.37
CA -0.44 0.67 0.55
CO -0.33 0.77 0.56
CT -0.37 0.31 0.32
FL -0.35 0.61 0.46
GA -0.3 0.77 0.55
HI -0.37 N/A 0.12
ID 0.09 0.63 0.27
IL -0.41 0.6 0.53
IN -0.27 0.72 0.51
IA -0.29 0.54 0.44
KS -0.24 0.65 0.41
KY -0.24 0.51 0.34
LA -0.25 0.59 0.39
ME -0.36 N/A 0.07
MD -0.35 0.62 0.43
MA -0.51 N/A 0.07
MI -0.43 0.62 0.53
MN -0.39 0.69 0.56
MS -0.28 0.52 0.43
MO -0.38 0.6 0.5
NE N/A 0.56 0.11
NV -0.28 0.6 0.46
NH -0.3 0.61 0.47
NJ -0.42 0.52 0.5
NM -0.34 0.57 0.48
NY -0.4 0.46 0.39
NC -0.3 0.6 0.49
OH -0.43 0.57 0.51
OK -0.09 0.59 0.29
OR -0.42 0.57 0.41
PA -0.3 0.49 0.41
RI -0.38 N/A 0.02
SC -0.37 0.76 0.54
TN -0.24 0.73 0.5
TX -0.31 0.7 0.51
UT -0.11 0.78 0.44
VA -0.29 0.61 0.44
WA -0.38 0.56 0.47
WV -0.31 0.43 0.37
WI -0.44 0.85 0.66
State Statistics for Polarization (2002-2010)
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The following table is also concerned with polarization data. It shows the average 
polarization scores for all Democrats and Republicans for each year of elections, as well as the 
standard deviation of all scores for each year. The average Democratic score remained relatively 
constant, ranging between -0.34 and -0.39. However, the average Republican score increased 
steadily, rising from 0.57 in 2002 to 0.68 in 2010. The distance between each party's average 
score increased every year. 
 
Year
Avg Dem 
Score
Avg Rep 
Score
Standard 
Deviation
2002 -0.37 0.57 0.49
2004 -0.38 0.59 0.51
2006 -0.36 0.63 0.52
2008 -0.34 0.66 0.52
2010 -0.39 0.68 0.56
Yearly Statistics for Polarization (2002-2010)
 
 
 To further illustrate these scores, the following graphs show the number of 
representatives that achieved certain scores for each election year. Barbara Lee (D-CA) had the 
lowest scores in 2002 and 2004, scoring a -0.69 in both years. In 2006, Pete Stark (D-CA) had 
the lowest score, earning a -0.7. Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) had the lowest scores in 2008 and 
2010, scoring a -0.73 and -0.78 respectively. Ron Paul (R-TX) had the highest score in each year, 
earning scores of 1.02, 1.09, 1.16, 1.23, and 1.29. Thus, the lowest score decreased in each 
election, and the highest score increased. Additionally, the scores are distinctly clustered by party 
with a gap in the middle range of scores. 
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 The table below shows the average percentage of the vote garnered by the winning 
candidates for each type of redistricting model, as well as their standard deviations. 
Redistricting 
Type
Avg Pct of 
Vote
Standard 
Deviation
Commission 63.5% 9.7%
Hybrid 67.3% 11.3%
Legislature 68.6% 13.5%
Congressional Election Outcomes by 
Redistricting Type
 
 The following tables all pertain to the three regression analyses used in this paper. The 
first illustrates the relationship between the method of redistricting (independent variable) and 
the percentage of the total vote a winning candidate receives (dependent variable). The types of 
redistricting, as mentioned above, were coded as dummy variables, and so only two types were 
used in the regression. For commission systems, the coefficient was -5.078, and it was significant 
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below the 0.001 level. For hybrid systems, the coefficient was -1.464, and it was significant at 
the 0.185 level. 
Independent 
Variable
Coefficient
Standard 
Error
Significance
Constant 68.576 0.307 <0.001
Commission -5.078 0.981 <0.001
Hybrid -1.464 1.105 0.185
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Vote
 
 The second and third regressions used show the relationship between percentage of the 
votes a winning candidate receives (independent variable) and the representative's polarization 
score (dependent variable). The first table shows this relationship amongst Democrats, and the 
second table amongst Republicans. The Democratic polarization score had a coefficient of -0.004 
and was significant below the 0.001 level. However, the Republican score only had a coefficient 
below 0.001, and a significance level of 0.754. 
 
Independent 
Variable
Coefficient
Standard 
Error
Significance
Constant -0.101 0.020 <0.001
Percentage of 
Vote -0.004 <0.001 <0.001
Dependent Variable: Democrat Polarization Score
 
 
Independent 
Variable
Coefficient
Standard 
Error
Significance
Constant 0.633 0.028 <0.001
Percentage of 
Vote <0.001 <0.001 0.754
Dependent Variable: Republican Polarization Score
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Analysis 
 Competitive Districts 
 The most important thing that can be grasped from the data presented on election 
outcomes is simply that elections are not competitive. In this stretch of five elections, the average 
percentage of the total vote garnered by the election winner was 68 percent, with a standard 
deviation of 13.1 percent. That means that the average representative is running in a very safe 
district. The least competitive states were Massachusetts and Alabama. The average in 
Massachusetts was 82 percent and Alabama's was 76 percent. Even when factoring in the 
standard deviations, both 17 percent, the majority of districts in these states are still safe, having 
winning percentages of at least about 60 percent. 
 The most competitive states were New Hampshire and Iowa. New Hampshire's average 
was 55 percent with a standard deviation of four percent. However, New Hampshire only has 
two districts, so this statistic does not tell us all that much. Iowa, however, similarly averaged 57 
percent, with a standard deviation of five percent, but has more districts. This means that the 
majority of its districts are relatively competitive, with the winning candidates garnering between 
about 52 and 62 percent of the vote. As mentioned in a previous section, Iowa takes very 
deliberate steps to ensure competitive districts. 
 Polarization 
 In terms of polarization scores, Democrats have held relatively constant, ranging between 
-0.34 and -0.39. However, Republicans have increased significantly, rising from 0.57 in 2002 to 
0.68 in 2010. As mentioned in section on methodology, this does not necessarily mean that 
Republicans are becoming more “conservative” while Democrats remain the same. However, it 
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does show that Republicans are moving proportionally further away from the center than 
Democrats. The most salient observation that can be drawn from the polarization scores is that, 
in the course of these five elections, the distance between the parties is steadily increasing. The 
difference between the parties' average scores was 0.94 in 2002, but 1.07 in 2010, which is a 14 
percent increase. 
 Redistricting 
 The data clearly shows that the model of redistricting has an effect on the competitiveness 
of districts. Winners of districts that were redrawn by legislatures garnered an average of 69 
percent of the vote. However, hybrid systems that give legislatures less autonomy in redistricting 
had winners with an average of 67 percent. States that only use independent commissions had the 
most competitive average percentage of votes, which was 63.5 percent. 
 Regression 
To further strengthen the observations above, this paper also uses a linear regression 
analysis. Using the regression data, much can be learned about the effect of the independent 
variables. In the first regression analysis, the independent variables are the types of redistricting. 
For commission systems, the coefficient is negative. This means that there is a negative 
relationship between this redistricting type and the percentages of votes, relative to legislature 
systems. The value of the coefficient for commission systems is -5.078. Thus, when a district 
uses a commission system, the average percentage of the vote garnered by the election winner is 
about 5 percentage points lower than in a legislature system. The significance of this method of 
redistricting is below 0.001, meaning that there is only a 0.1 percent chance that the correlation 
occurs randomly. Similarly, the coefficient for hybrid systems is negative, and also has a value of 
-1.464. This means that the average percentage of the vote garnered by the election winner in a 
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hybrid system is about 1.5 percentage points lower than in a legislature system. However, the 
significance is 0.185, which is above the 0.05 limit discussed previously. 
In the second regression analysis, the independent variable is the vote percentages. The 
coefficient of this variable is negative, meaning that there is a negative relationship between the 
vote percentages and the Democratic polarization scores. This means that as the vote percentages 
increase, the Democratic polarization scores decrease. The value of the coefficient for vote 
percentages is -0.004. Thus, when the vote percentage increases by 10 percentage points, the 
Democratic polarization score is expected to decrease by 0.04. The significance of the percentage 
of votes is below 0.001, meaning that there is only a 0.1 percent chance that the correlation 
occurs randomly. All of this means that, when a district elects a Democrat, the less competitive 
the election is, the lower the winner’s score will be. Thus, the winner will become increasingly 
polarized because his or her score becomes increasingly negative in value.  
 In the third regression analysis, the independent variable is also the vote percentages, but 
the dependent variable is now Republican polarization scores. The coefficient is positive, 
meaning that there is a positive relationship between the vote percentage and the polarization 
score. However, the level of significance is 0.754. This means that there is a 75.4 percent that the 
relationship is random, which is far above the five percent standard. Thus, the levels of 
polarization for Republican winners do not increase when their districts are less competitive. 
 
Conclusion 
 From the data and analysis examined in this paper, many conclusions can be drawn. One 
of the major findings is that states’ districts were not competitive in this time period. The average 
district winner garnered 68 percent of votes, which is a very safe margin of victory. Another 
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conclusion that can be drawn is that Congress became more polarized in this time period, as the 
distance between the average polarization scores of Democrats and Republicans increased by 14 
percent. While Democrats average polarization scores remained relatively constant, Republicans 
scores rose significantly. It can also be concluded that the percentage of votes garnered by 
winning candidates is dependent on a state’s method of redistricting at a very significant level. 
Simply put, states with lower levels of redistricting authority given to their legislatures tend to 
have more competitive elections. Additionally, the polarization scores of Democratic 
representatives are dependent on the percentage of votes garnered by winning Democratic 
candidates at a very significant level. This means that Democrats from less competitive districts 
tend to be more polarized. However, there is not a significant relationship between Republican 
polarization scores and their percentage of votes, meaning that Republican representatives from 
less competitive districts are not necessarily more polarized.  
 Based on these conclusions, this paper agrees with Mann and Cain that redistricting is 
only one factor responsible for contemporary climate of declining competition and growing 
polarization of the parties (2005). While redistricting reform is not a panacea for these problems, 
it is not an unreasonable place to start (Mann and Cain, 2005), and there is clearly an argument 
for policy changes in the methods of redistricting. To this end, much can be learned from the 
Iowa system, which is truly unique from any other state. From a theoretical standpoint, Iowa has 
implemented a system designed to eliminate the possibility of gerrymandering, or drawing 
districts based on partisan agendas. It is drawn by a non-partisan government agency, which 
diminishes the likelihood of party leaders having a strong impact on redistricting. Additionally, 
the redistricting body cannot consider political data. Such factors as previous election results, the 
residences of incumbent candidates, and the political affiliations of registered voters are ignored, 
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which is not the case in almost all states. Rather than looking at these indicators, the Iowa system 
is concerned with drawing logically sensible districts. Its overarching concern is to create 
districts that are equal in population, followed by keeping districts compact, maintaining political 
boundaries, and keeping districts contiguous (Nelson, 2010). 
 Not only has Iowa implemented a thoughtful system for keeping partisan bias out of 
districts, it also has been successful. In this time period, the winning candidates in Iowa garnered 
an average vote percentage of 57.1 percent. That was the second lowest of the 43 states 
examined, and the lowest among states with more than two districts. Iowa’s candidates were also 
not very polarized in this time period. Its Democratic representatives averaged a score of -0.29, 
and its Republican representatives averaged a score of 0.54. These were the thirteenth and tenth 
least polarizing scores, respectively, and were both below the national averages in all five 
elections.  
There are other factors that could account for the competitiveness of districts and 
polarization. One is the differences in voting tendencies of different regions. For example, the 
southeastern United States might vote with different results than the West Coast. Another factor 
could be the party makeup of voters within a state. Massachusetts, for example, had no 
Republican representatives in this time period, and also had districts that were very non-
competitive, meaning that there could be an overwhelming number of Democrats in the state. 
Incumbency status could also be an important factor because incumbents have certain advantages 
over new candidates. However, by implementing policies similar to Iowa, other states would 
hopefully be able to make their districts more competitive. For Democrats, more competitive 
districts would most likely translate into less polarized candidates. While Republican 
polarization scores were not tied to the competitiveness of their districts, more competitive 
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districts and more centrist Democrats would hopefully inspire Republican voters and legislators 
to become more centralized and willing to cooperate on legislation. However, more research is 
needed to determine the root of the growing Republican level of polarization, as well as further 
policy changes that can help reduce it. 
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